All possible parses are searched exhaustively, but rather that multiple sufficiently probable parses are considered in parallel (cf. Crocker Brants, 2000; Jurafsky, 1996; Lewis, 2000; see also Levy, Bicknell, Slattery, Rayner, 2009, and Traxler, 2014 for discussions of this issue). If the bottom-up input is inconsistent with these predicted parses, they are then shifted or reweighted (Crocker Brants, 2000; Gorrell, 1987, 1989; Jurafsky, 1996; Levy, 2008; Narayanan Jurafsky, 2002). A similar debate has ensued in relation to lexico-semantic prediction. Some have suggested that, because cloze probabilities are derived by averaging across participants and trials (see footnote 1), they are not reflective of what an individual comprehender predicts on any given trial. These researchers assume that the comprehender first predicts the word with the highest cloze probability (the strength of the 3-MethyladenineMedChemExpress 3-MA prediction being related to this probability), and if this is 3-MA site disconfirmed by the bottom-up input, she turns to the word with the next highest cloze probability (Van Petten Luka, 2012). Others, however, interpret the cloze profile as reflecting the strength/probability of parallel expectations that an individual’s brain computes on any given trial. So, for example, if a context has a cloze profile of 55 probability for word X, 25 for word Y and 20 for word Z, then all three possibilities are computed and represented with degrees of belief that correspond to these probabilities; if the bottom-up input turns out to be word Z, then there is a shifting or reweighting of these relative beliefs such that the comprehender now believes continuation Z with nearly 100 probability (DeLong et al., 2005; Wlotko Federmeier, 2012; see also Staub, Grant, Astheimer, Cohen, 2015). In practice, it can often be difficult to experimentally distinguish between serial and parallel probabilistic prediction (for discussion in relation to syntactic prediction, see Gibson Pearlmutter, 2000; Lewis, 2000; and in relation to lexico-semantic prediction, see Van Petten Luka, 2012). However, as we discuss below, under certain assumptions, there is a mathematical relationship between surprisal and Bayesian belief updating, which is consistent with the idea that we can predictively compute multiple candidates in parallel, each with different strengths or degrees of belief. Computational insights In his now highly influential work, Anderson (1990) proposed a rational approach to cognition (for discussion, see Simon, 1990). The `ideal observer’ and related models that have grown out of this work have had a tremendous influence on many disciplines in the cognitive sciences (see Chater Manning, 2006; Clark, 2013; Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, Tenenbaum, 2010; Knill Pouget, 2004 for reviews, and see Perfors, Tenenbaum, Griffiths, Xu, 2011, for an excellent introductory overview). This is also true of language processing (e.g., Bejjanki et al., 2011, Chater, Crocker Pickering, 1998; Clayards, Tanenhaus, Aslin, Jacobs, 2008; Feldman et al., 2009; Kleinschmidt Jaeger, 2015; Levy, 2008; Norris, 2006; Norris McQueen, 2008; see also Crocker Brants, 2000; Hale, 2001; Jurafsky, 1996; Narayanan Jurafsky, 2002, for important antecedents of this work in the parsing literature). Within this framework, the way that a rational comprehender can maximize the probability of accurately recognizing new linguistic input is to use all her stored probabilisticLang Cogn.All possible parses are searched exhaustively, but rather that multiple sufficiently probable parses are considered in parallel (cf. Crocker Brants, 2000; Jurafsky, 1996; Lewis, 2000; see also Levy, Bicknell, Slattery, Rayner, 2009, and Traxler, 2014 for discussions of this issue). If the bottom-up input is inconsistent with these predicted parses, they are then shifted or reweighted (Crocker Brants, 2000; Gorrell, 1987, 1989; Jurafsky, 1996; Levy, 2008; Narayanan Jurafsky, 2002). A similar debate has ensued in relation to lexico-semantic prediction. Some have suggested that, because cloze probabilities are derived by averaging across participants and trials (see footnote 1), they are not reflective of what an individual comprehender predicts on any given trial. These researchers assume that the comprehender first predicts the word with the highest cloze probability (the strength of the prediction being related to this probability), and if this is disconfirmed by the bottom-up input, she turns to the word with the next highest cloze probability (Van Petten Luka, 2012). Others, however, interpret the cloze profile as reflecting the strength/probability of parallel expectations that an individual’s brain computes on any given trial. So, for example, if a context has a cloze profile of 55 probability for word X, 25 for word Y and 20 for word Z, then all three possibilities are computed and represented with degrees of belief that correspond to these probabilities; if the bottom-up input turns out to be word Z, then there is a shifting or reweighting of these relative beliefs such that the comprehender now believes continuation Z with nearly 100 probability (DeLong et al., 2005; Wlotko Federmeier, 2012; see also Staub, Grant, Astheimer, Cohen, 2015). In practice, it can often be difficult to experimentally distinguish between serial and parallel probabilistic prediction (for discussion in relation to syntactic prediction, see Gibson Pearlmutter, 2000; Lewis, 2000; and in relation to lexico-semantic prediction, see Van Petten Luka, 2012). However, as we discuss below, under certain assumptions, there is a mathematical relationship between surprisal and Bayesian belief updating, which is consistent with the idea that we can predictively compute multiple candidates in parallel, each with different strengths or degrees of belief. Computational insights In his now highly influential work, Anderson (1990) proposed a rational approach to cognition (for discussion, see Simon, 1990). The `ideal observer’ and related models that have grown out of this work have had a tremendous influence on many disciplines in the cognitive sciences (see Chater Manning, 2006; Clark, 2013; Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, Tenenbaum, 2010; Knill Pouget, 2004 for reviews, and see Perfors, Tenenbaum, Griffiths, Xu, 2011, for an excellent introductory overview). This is also true of language processing (e.g., Bejjanki et al., 2011, Chater, Crocker Pickering, 1998; Clayards, Tanenhaus, Aslin, Jacobs, 2008; Feldman et al., 2009; Kleinschmidt Jaeger, 2015; Levy, 2008; Norris, 2006; Norris McQueen, 2008; see also Crocker Brants, 2000; Hale, 2001; Jurafsky, 1996; Narayanan Jurafsky, 2002, for important antecedents of this work in the parsing literature). Within this framework, the way that a rational comprehender can maximize the probability of accurately recognizing new linguistic input is to use all her stored probabilisticLang Cogn.
